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Abstract
This paper analyzes welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes towards im-
migrants - within and across countries - and their interaction with labor-market drivers
of preferences. We consider two different mechanisms through which a redistributive
welfare system might adjust as a result of immigration. In the first model, immigra-
tion has a larger impact on individuals at the top of the income distribution, while
under the second model it is low-income individuals who are most affected through
this channel. Individual attitudes are consistent with the first welfare-state model and
with labor-market determinants of immigration attitudes. In countries where natives
are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual income is negatively corre-
lated with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is positively correlated
with them. These relationships have the opposite signs in economies characterized
by skilled migration (relative to the native population). These results are confirmed
when we exploit international differences in the characteristics of destination countries’
welfare state.
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“ We must end welfare state subsidies for illegal immigrants...This alienates taxpayers and
breeds suspicion of immigrants, even though the majority of them work very hard. Without
a welfare state, we would know that everyone coming to America wanted to work hard and
support himself.” Rep. Ron Paul, R-Texas.1
1 Introduction
No other facet of globalization has spurred as much public debate as the movement of
workers across national boundaries. Even within ideologically homogeneous groups often
contradictory positions emerge. U.S. labor unions, although now officially welcoming Latino
and immigrant members2, see their ranks and file oppose growing inflows of unskilled foreign
workers. Similarly, while Silicon Valley entrepreneurs trooped in front of Congress in 1998 to
obtain an increase in the number of H1-B visas, many conservative groups fear immigration
and have fiercely opposed the 2004 proposal of the Bush administration to grant illegal
immigrants legal status as guest workers.
A large portion of the discussion is fuelled by the income-distribution consequences of im-
migration. Native workers are concerned about new immigrants of similar skill levels because
they are wary of increasing competition3, inducing downward pressure on their incomes and
contributing to the growing feeling of uncertainty that accompanies globalization.4 On the
other hand, native workers welcome immigrants who complement them in the labor market.
A second and not less important dimension of the debate is represented by the welfare state
channel. In fact, the very existence in many destination countries of redistributive social
insurance programs is likely to have a magnetic effect on large numbers of unskilled immi-
grants, interested not only in new job opportunities, but also in the benefits that come in
the form of subsidized health care, unemployment compensation or provisions concerning
dependants.5 While this type of labor flows is likely to represent a net burden for the pub-
lic finances of the host countries, in general migration can have the opposite effect on the
welfare state, for example when migrants are skilled. Regardless of whether immigration
1Cited from US Fed News, August 8, 2005.
2See Watts (2002).
3For instance, the threatening “Polish plumber” has been often mentioned as heavily conditioning the
French vote against the new European constitution.
4See for instance Rodrik (1997).
5See Borjas (1999a), and Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002).
2
represents a net cost or benefit for public finances, adjustments in the redistribution carried
out by the welfare state are unavoidable. Importantly, this paper shows that the type of
response carried out by the welfare state is a key determinant of the effect of immigration
on various subgroups of the population and, as a consequence, on individual opinions about
migration. To shed light on these issues, we develop a theoretical framework of individual
attitudes towards migration in which the labor market and welfare state interact with each
other as drivers of opinions.
The analysis of the labor-market channel follows the previous literature.6 We focus on
two factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor, and consider cases in which migrants
are either less or more skilled than native workers. We show that the probability that an
individual is pro-immigration is an increasing (decreasing) function of her skill in countries
where the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is high (low). The intuition is
that, when immigrants are unskilled, they reduce the relative supply of skilled to unskilled
labor in the economy, thus increasing the skilled wage and reducing the unskilled wage. The
opposite is true when immigrants are more skilled than natives.
More importantly, in our model we consider two alternative adjustment mechanisms
through which the welfare state of the host country can respond to an inflow of immigrants.7
In each welfare-state model, we analyze the effect of an inflow of either unskilled or skilled
foreign workers. While the former represent a net cost for the welfare state, the latter are
likely8 to make a positive net contribution to the system. In the first welfare–state model
we assume that, following immigration, the value of per capita benefits is unaffected, while
welfare costs (tax rates) adjust in order to balance the government’s budget (tax adjustment
model). Assuming a redistributive fiscal system, we find that high-income individuals are
more negatively affected by unskilled immigration than low-income individuals - as they bear
most of the additional cost to the welfare system. However, they are more positively affected
than low-income individuals by skilled immigration. In general, in the tax adjustment model,
immigration has a larger impact on individuals at the top of the income distribution. In
6See Borjas (1999b), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006).
7We assume that individuals take as given one of the two adjustments of the welfare state, that is
respondents do not perceive the adjustment type as endogenous to immigration. Therefore, ours is not a
political-economy model and is best suited for a short-run analysis. See, among others, Razin, Sadka, and
Swagel (2002) and Ortega (2005) for long-run political-economy models of migration and the welfare state.
8As it will become clearer in section 3, skilled migrant workers are not necessarily net contributors to the
welfare state, because differently from their native counterparts, they are endowed only with labor–related
assets.
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the second welfare–state model, we assume instead that the adjustment induced by immi-
gration occurs through changes in per capita welfare benefits, as tax rates are kept constant
(benefit adjustment model). Under these assumptions, if immigrants are unskilled relative to
natives, the burden of the worsened fiscal position of the welfare state falls relatively more
on individuals at the bottom of the income distribution. In other words, unskilled immi-
gration negatively affects low-income households to a greater extent than their high-income
counterparts. If immigration is instead skilled - and is thus likely to relax the government’s
budget constraint - it will lead to an improvement in the position of low-income workers
through the welfare state channel that is greater than for high-income individuals. In gen-
eral, in the benefit adjustment model, it is low-income individuals who are most affected
by immigration. To summarize, in the tax adjustment model we expect individual income
to be negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in countries where the skill
composition of natives relative to immigrants is high (unskilled immigration), and positively
correlated otherwise (skilled immigration). In the benefit adjustment model, we expect the
opposite type of cross-country pattern.9
Our empirical analysis, carried out using the 1995 National Identity Module of the In-
ternational Social Survey Program, both provides new cross-country evidence for the role
of welfare-state considerations and reinforces the results in the literature on labor-market
determinants. In particular, using a direct and indirect measure of the relative skill mix of
natives to immigrants, we find evidence that is consistent with the tax adjustment model
(according to which it is high-income individuals who are most affected through the welfare-
state channel) and with labor-market determinants of immigration attitudes. Our results
show that, in countries where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants, individ-
ual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill
is positively correlated with them. These relationships have the opposite signs in destina-
tions characterized by skilled migration. We confirm the robustness of these results using
an alternative data set, the European Social Survey, carried out in 2002-2003 on a different
sample of countries.
9In order to simplify the analysis, we only consider two extreme cases in terms of the adjustment of the
welfare state. However, it is possible to extend this framework and consider intermediate cases, where both
tax rates and per capita benefits adjust. In that case what will matter is whether the adjustment takes place
relatively more along one dimension, as opposed to the other. Ruling out measure zero events - when no
adjustment dominates - either one set of predictions or the other holds.
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A growing literature in economics focuses on individual preferences10, as they represent a
primary determinant of final policy outcomes (Rodrik 1995). In this paper we study welfare-
state determinants of migration opinions, for two main reasons. First, public-finance issues
have played a key role in the historical debate on immigration. However, there are only few
papers in the literature that investigate welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes11
and they either focus on a single country or do not exploit the variation in the data across
countries. In our analysis, instead, we investigate cross-country heterogeneity in the impact
of individual-level variables by taking advantage of the variation in the data both at the indi-
vidual and at the country levels. The second reason for this paper is methodological. In the
existing literature, the correlation between individual skill and pro-immigration attitudes is
interpreted as evidence in support of a labor-market competition story.12 For example, in the
United States and other countries receiving unskilled migration, the estimated correlation
is positive, which is consistent with the labor-market hypothesis. However, given that indi-
vidual skill and income are positively correlated, the same pattern would be observed in the
data according to the benefit adjustment model. In other words, it might well be that skilled
individuals are less opposed to unskilled immigration because they also enjoy high incomes
and do not use public services, relatively speaking, as much as the unskilled. As a result, it
is difficult to separate the effect of the two channels on individual attitudes. In general, any
other determinant of pro-immigration attitudes which is correlated with individual skill will
give rise to a similar problem of omitted variable bias. In order to isolate the labor-market
channel, previous studies (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda 2006) compare the correla-
tion between skill and pro-immigration preferences in the labor-force vs. out-of-labor-force
subsamples. Any correlation should disappear for individuals out of the labor force if the
labor market is what is driving the result, which is in fact what the previous literature finds.
In this paper we tackle the problem in a different way. By explicitly considering welfare-
state drivers, our analysis provides a new and more direct approach to differentiate between
labor-market and public-finance determinants.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature related to this
10See, for example, Luttmer (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004),
Caplan (2002) and the literature surveyed below.
11See Hanson (2005), Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007), Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005), Dust-
mann and Preston (2004a) and Dustmann and Preston (2004b).
12See Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Kessler (2001), Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006). See
Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2005) for an alternative interpretation of
the empirical evidence.
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paper, while Section 3 presents the two theoretical models. In Section 4 we describe the data
used in the empirical analysis, whose results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. The first investigates the impact
of immigration on the welfare state and has shaped the debate about immigration policy
in the United States, Europe and other destination countries. Borjas and Hilton (1996)
and Borjas (1999b), for instance, have extensively documented how immigrant households
that have relocated to the United States during the eighties and nineties are more likely
to receive welfare benefits than the native population. While most of the existing gap in
participation rates can be explained by observable characteristics, this is evidence of the
growing pressure put on state and federal budgets by “New Americans”.13 Boeri, Hanson,
and McCormick (2002), considering a large sample of EU countries, point out instead a
substantial dispersion in the immigrants’ participation in the welfare state. Furthermore,
they show that while immigrants are on average more likely than natives to be on the
receiving end of unemployment and family benefits, this turns out not to be the case for old
age pension benefits.14
Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) analyze the extent to which, in the long run, immigration
affects the redistribution carried out by the welfare state. In a very elegant theoretical model
the paper shows how – somewhat surprisingly – the presence of a fiscal leakage from the
native to the foreign born population is likely to play against redistribution towards the less
skilled.15
The second set of papers related to our work looks, more specifically, at how welfare-state
13For an analysis of the long run effects of immigration in the US, see also Smith and Edmonston (1997).
14See Table 3.2, page 74 (Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick 2002). This argument has been used by many
policy makers in Europe to highlight the potential role of immigration policy as a tool to deal with the
difficulties created by pay as you go social security systems in the presence of an ageing population. For
a formal analysis, see Razin and Sadka (1999), while Storesletten (2000) has studied how migration policy
can be used to sustain the existing welfare system in the United States. See also Haupt and Peters (2003).
Casarico and Devillanova (2003) consider the two adjustment models in their analysis of the impact of
immigration on the social security system.
15The intuition for this result is that, as the number of migrants grows, a larger proportion of the fiscal
revenues ends up in the hands of unskilled immigrants, which implies that native taxpayers – among whom
the median voter will most likely be counted – will opt for lower taxes.
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considerations affect individual perceptions of immigration. Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter
(2007) investigate the impact of both public-finance and labor-market variables on individual
preferences over globalization - migration and trade - in the U.S. in 1992 and 2000. Their
empirical analysis shows that, while the pre-tax cleavages in individual attitudes - working
through the labor-market channel - are similar for immigration and trade, the post-tax cleav-
ages in opinions - working through the public-finance channel - are different. The authors
conclude that welfare-state considerations are therefore important in explaining differences
in individual attitudes towards alternative globalization strategies. Hanson, Scheve, and
Slaughter (2007) is the paper in the literature closest to ours. From a theoretical point of
view, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) differs from our work in that it does not con-
sider the two public-finance models we instead analyze, implicitly assuming that the first
one holds.16 From an empirical point of view, while their paper focuses on the United States
and exploits the across-states variation in the data, our analysis is a cross-country one.
In addition, the main innovation of our empirical analysis relative to Hanson, Scheve, and
Slaughter (2007) is to incorporate data on the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants,
which varies considerably across countries and affects whether immigrants represent a net
burden or benefit for the welfare state.17 The role of the welfare state channel in explaining
attitudes towards immigration is also highlighted in Hanson (2005), where a ‘rights–based’
immigration policy is proposed to limit the burden put by unskilled immigrants on the
welfare state.18
Dustmann and Preston (2004b) empirically analyze attitudes towards immigrants in
Great Britain using seven consecutive waves of an individual-level panel data set, the British
Social Attitudes Survey. The authors develop a structural multiple-factor model which uses
responses to various questions on racial, labor-market, and welfare issues to estimate the
direct impact of the underlying three factors on immigration attitudes. Using a similar
structural multiple-factor model on data from the 2002-2003 wave of the European Social
16Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter’s (2007) empirical work makes it possible to distinguish between the
two mechanisms. As a matter of fact, one can read their results as consistent with what we call the tax
adjustment mechanism. However they do not explicitly address the distinction between the two scenarios.
17Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005) use across-states variation in the skill composition of immigrants
to the U.S.. This paper estimates the impact of the latter variable on skill cleavages in U.S. immigration
opinions, but not separately for the labor-market vs. welfare-state channel.
18The basic idea is to differentiate the level of entitlement to public benefits, depending on how long the
immigrants have been in the host country. The immediate effect of this policy would be a reduction in the
benefits available to immigrants through the welfare state.
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Survey, Dustmann and Preston (2004a) focus on economic variables and analyze three alter-
native channels through which individual attitudes towards immigrants are affected: labor
market competition, public burden, and efficiency considerations. Besides the methodolog-
ical approach, these two works differ from our paper since the analysis focuses on a single
country (Dustmann and Preston 2004b) or does not explore the cross-country heterogene-
ity in the effect of individual-level variables (Dustmann and Preston 2004a). In addition,
the welfare state is implicitly assumed to adjust to immigration through changes in the tax
levels.
Finally, our paper is also related to analyses of immigration preferences which focus on
the labor-market competition hypothesis. Using data on the United States, both Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) and Kessler (2001) find that more educated individuals are more likely
to be pro-immigration, which is consistent with a labor-market story, as immigrants to the
United States are less skilled than natives on average. Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and
Sinnott (2006) extend the analysis to a multi-country framework. Both papers find that a
key variable determining the sign of country-specific correlations, between individual skill and
attitudes, is the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. Using both direct and
indirect measures of this variable, individual skill is estimated to be positively (negatively)
correlated with pro-immigration preferences if migrants are unskilled (skilled). Our paper
finds the same results but in a broader framework, where the labor market interacts with
the welfare state.
3 Theoretical Framework
To analyze the effect of immigration on individual attitudes we consider a simple two–factors
HO model of a small open economy19 with and without diversification in production, and we
augment it by incorporating a redistributive welfare system, like in Dustmann and Preston
(2004a).20 If production is diversified, two goods are produced. Alternatively, if the economy
is not diversified, only one good is produced. We can think of the two production factors
as unskilled (LU) and skilled labor (LS). They are combined using a constant returns to
scale technology yi = fi(LU , LS) to produce output i ∈ 1, 2. We will assume good 1 to be
19Thus, since a small open economy without non-tradeable sectors takes international prices as given, we
abstract from the potential price effects of immigration.
20The main difference between our framework and theirs is that, while we allow the welfare state to adjust
to migration in two different ways, they assume the adjustment to occur only through changes in tax rates.
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the nume´raire, so that its price will be normalized to 1, while p will be the price of good
2. The economy is populated by a set of N natives, indexed by n, and by M immigrants,
indexed by m. Each native is endowed with one unit of labor (either skilled or unskilled) and
with an amount en ∈ {eL, eH} of the nume´raire good, where eH > eL. As a result, we can
distinguish four different types of individuals, based on their skill levels and asset holdings.21
Immigrants are only endowed with either one unit of skilled or unskilled labor.22 The total
endowment of the nume´raire good in the economy is thus given by
∑
n
en = E
while the total supply of each skill is given by
Lj = φjN + ψjM j ∈ {U, S} (1)
where φj and ψj are, respectively, the share of workers of skill profile j in the native and
immigrant populations, and
∑
j φj =
∑
j ψj = 1. The key variable in our analysis of the
effect of immigration is the migrants to native ratio, which is defined as pi =M/N and which,
for simplicity, we will assume to be equal to zero in the initial equilibrium. Furthermore, the
number of natives will be held constant throughout the analysis. A change in the immigrants
to natives ratio will impact the domestic availability of the two types of skills in the following
way:
Lˆj
dpi
=
ψj
φj
= βj (2)
where Lˆj =
dLj
Lj
etc. Let wj be the (before tax) prevailing wage rate, with wS > wU . Let
ci(wU , wS) be the unit cost function for good i. Wages and outputs are determined by two
sets of equilibrium conditions. Firstly, equilibrium in the factor market requires supply to
21As skilled individuals with a limited initial endowment could well be poorer than low skilled individuals
with abundant assets, we allow for individual skill and income to be not perfectly correlated, and we will
exploit this differential variation in the empirical analysis.
22We make this assumption, following Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002), to highlight the possibility of a
welfare leakage effect from natives to migrants.
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be equal to demand,
LU = y1
∂c1(wU , wS)
∂wU
+ y2
∂c2(wU , wS)
∂wU
(3)
LS = y1
∂c1(wU , wS)
∂wS
+ y2
∂c2(wU , wS)
∂wS
(4)
Secondly, perfect competition implies that firms earn non-positive profits in equilibrium, i.e.
1 ≤ c1(wU , wS) (5)
p ≤ c2(wU , wS) (6)
Assume that the government intends to levy an egalitarian income tax consisting of a flat rate
τ , accompanied by a lump sum rebate b.23 The cash grant may be thought of as capturing
the provision of free public services, and for simplicity we are assuming that migrants are
entitled to all public programs available in the destination country. Thus, by design, our tax
system is redistributive. The government budget constraint can be written as
τ(wULU + wSLS + E) = b(N +M) (7)
Immigration affects the well being of the current residents through three possible channels:
tax rates, per capita transfers24 and labor market. The net income of a native n of skill level
j is given by
Inj = (1− τ)Gnj + b, (8)
where Gnj = wj + e
n. The effect of immigration on her net income can then be measured by
Iˆnj
dpi
=
(1− τ)wj wˆjdpi
Inj
− τG
n
j
τˆ
dpi
Inj
+
b bˆ
dpi
Inj
(9)
The first term represents the labor market effect, the second is the effect through the ad-
23The literature has suggested (Mirrlees 1971) that the best egalitarian income tax can be approximated
by a linear tax. This strategy has been followed for instance by Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002), among
others.
24The first two channels work through the welfare state. In our model, we assume that the government’s
budget constraint must be satisfied in each year. In practice, immigration might also affect the welfare state
through its impact on the accumulation of public debt. While explicitly modeling this channel would render
the analysis more complicated, allowing for the accumulation of debt would only shift into the future the
choice between changing taxes or benefits to accommodate immigration.
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justment in the tax level and the third term represents the adjustment induced in the gov-
ernment’s transfers to the residents. We will now consider the effect of immigration on the
utility of current residents under two different hypotheses. First, we will assume that factor
returns are not affected by immigration, and will call this the ‘no labor market effect’. Next
we will study the effect of immigration when a change in endowments changes instead factor
returns.
3.1 No labor market effect
To gain some intuition on the importance of the type of welfare-state response to immigra-
tion in shaping individual attitudes, we consider a simplified setting in which one of two
adjustments can occur. In the first, which we label the tax adjustment model, per capita
transfers are held constant, and the tax rate reacts to maintain the government’s budget
in equilibrium. In the second, which we call the benefit adjustment model, tax rates do not
change, while the per capita transfers adjust. We start by analyzing the tax adjustment
model. Totally differentiating equation (7), after a few manipulations we obtain
τˆ +
∑
j
ηjLˆj = dpi (10)
where ηj =
wjLjP
i wiLi+E
for j = U, S is the share of labor of skill level j in total domestic
income, and ηE = 1−ηU −ηS is the share of the initial endowment in total domestic income.
The effect of immigration on the tax rate is given by
τˆ
dpi
=
(φU − ηU)(βU − 1)
(1− φU) +
ηE(1− ψU)
1− φU , (11)
where φU − ηU is the difference between the share of the unskilled in the initial population
and their share in the initial GDP. Since wU < wS, it follows immediately that φU > ηU .
Consider equation (11) and to begin with, assume that the share of initial endowment in
national income is nil, i.e. that ηE = 0. If the native and migrant skill compositions are
identical, i.e. if βU = 1, an inflow of immigrants will not alter the current tax level. If
instead immigrants are less skilled on average than natives, i.e. if βU > 1, their presence
will lead to an increase in the tax rate. This is intuitive since in order to maintain the same
per capita transfer, a reduction in the per capita pre-tax income will require an increase in
the tax rate. If the share of the initial endowment in national income is instead positive, i.e.
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ηE > 0, the increase in the tax rate needed to maintain a given demogrant in the presence
of unskilled immigration will be even higher. As immigrants in our model are assumed not
to own other assets besides labor, even if they are as skilled as natives (i.e. βU = 1), they
represent a net burden for the welfare state and this will require an increase in the tax rate
to maintain the demogrant unchanged. The following proposition then holds
Proposition 1 (Tax adjustment model) Holding the demogrant unchanged, an inflow of
unskilled immigrants is less desirable for an individual the higher her pre-tax income. To the
contrary, an inflow of skilled immigrants is more desirable for an individual the higher her
pre-tax income as long as ηE < η
∗
E, where η
∗
E =
(1−βU )(φU−ηU )
(1−ψU ) .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 tells us that, if the demogrant is held fixed, the redistributive nature of
the existing fiscal system implies that the cost of an inflow of unskilled immigrants will
fall disproportionately more on higher income natives. Similarly, if immigration is skilled
in nature, the higher-income natives will be the largest beneficiaries since they will enjoy
a disproportionately large decrease in their net tax burden. To see how the relationship is
affected by a change in the extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we need
to calculate the following derivative:
d
(
∂
“
Iˆ
dpi
”
∂G
)
dτ
= − τˆ
dpi
2bG
[b+G(1− τ)]3 , (12)
which is negative as long as immigration is unskilled since τˆ
dpi
≥ 0. In other words, the
negative relationship between individual income and pro-immigration preferences (according
to the tax adjustment model, given unskilled migration) becomes more pronounced the more
redistributive the welfare system is.
We turn now to the benefit adjustment model, in which tax rates are held fixed, and the
government’s budget is kept in equilibrium by changes in the demogrant. Totally differenti-
ating equation (7), we have
bˆ
dpi
=
(φU − ηU)(1− βU)
1− φU −
ηE(1− ψU)
(1− φU) (13)
Also in this case, if ηE = 0 and βU = 1, migration will have no effect on the demogrant.
On the other hand, since φU > ηU , unskilled immigration (i.e. βU > 1) will lead to a decline
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in the per capita transfers,25 while skilled immigration (βU < 1) will lead to an increase. If
ηE > 0, the reduction in the demogrant which follows from an inflow of unskilled immigrants
will be even larger. In fact a positive share of initial endowment in national income implies
that natives are richer, ceteris paribus, than the immigrants in the initial equilibrium. As a
result, the effect of unskilled immigration on the demogrant, holding the tax fixed, will be
more pronounced.
The following result characterizes the effect of immigration on the current residents.
Proposition 2 (Benefit adjustment model) Holding the tax rates fixed, an inflow of un-
skilled immigrants is less desirable for an individual the lower her pre-tax income. To the
contrary, an inflow of skilled immigrants is more desirable for an individual the lower her
pre-tax income as long as ηE < η
∗
E, where η
∗
E =
(1−βU )(φU−ηU )
(1−ψU ) .
Proof. See Appendix.
The result in proposition 2 is fairly general and the intuition is straightforward. The
inflow of unskilled immigrants will – for a given tax rate – reduce the demogrant paid to
every native. The reduction in the demogrant will have a larger impact on the individuals
with a smaller income. The opposite is true – that is, the increase in the demogrant will have
a more positive impact on low-income individuals – if immigration is instead skilled, and
the share of the initial endowment in national income is small. To see how the relationship
is affected by a change in the redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we need to
calculate the following derivative:
d
(
∂
“
Iˆ
dpi
”
∂G
)
db
= − bˆ
dpi
[G(1− τ)− b]
[b+G(1− τ)]3 , (14)
which is positive if migration is unskilled as long as G(1− τ) > b.
3.2 With labor market effects
We turn now to the second setting, in which the economy is initially specialized in the
production of only good one. Factor returns are then determined by the following set of
25Furthermore, as is intuitive, the more unskilled immigrants are, the larger will be the reduction in the
demogrant. To see this, notice that
∂
“
bˆ
dpi
”
∂ψU
= ηU−φU (ηS+ηU )φU (1−φU ) < 0 since
ηU
φU
< ηSφS .
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equations
1 = c1(wU , wS) (15)
LU = y1
∂c1(wU , wS)
∂wU
(16)
LS = y1
∂c1(wU , wS)
∂wS
(17)
Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions, it is easy to show that the effect of immi-
gration on wages is given by
wˆU
dpi
=
βU − βS
²UU − (²SU + ηUηS ²US) +
ηU
ηS
²SS
(18)
wˆS
dpi
= −ηU
ηS
βU − βS
²UU − (²SU + ηUηS ²US) +
ηU
ηS
²SS
(19)
where ²ij =
∂Li
∂wj
wj
Li
. From these two equations, we immediately see that only if immigrants
share exactly the same skill composition as natives, there will be no wage effects. If the
skill composition of immigrants is different from that of the natives, then there will be wage
effects. In particular, an inflow of unskilled immigrants will lead to a reduction of the wage
of domestic unskilled workers, while the opposite will hold for skilled workers.26
Turning back to the effect of immigration on the welfare state when wages adjust, holding
the demogrant unchanged (tax adjustment model) the impact on the tax rates of skilled and
unskilled immigration can be rewritten as
τˆ
dpi
=
(φU − ηU)(βU − 1)
(1− φU) +
ηE(1− ψU)
1− φU −
∑
j
ηj
wˆj
dpi
(20)
On the other hand, holding the tax rates constant and allowing the demogrant to adjust
(benefit adjustment model), the impact of immigration on the demogrant becomes
bˆ
dpi
=
(φU − ηU)(1− βU)
1− φU −
ηE(1− ψU)
1− φU +
∑
j
ηj
wˆj
dpi
(21)
In both situations, we can see that now the effects on the two dimensions of the fiscal
26This result follows from the concavity of the cost function, which implies that the sign of the denominator
of equation (18) is negative. See Dustmann and Preston (2004a) for a proof.
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state will be mediated by the labor market. At the margin, labor is paid the value of its
marginal product, so a marginal inflow of immigrants will leave the total remuneration of the
existing labor force unchanged (
∑
j ηj
wˆj
dpi
= 0) and have no effect on the redistribution carried
out by the welfare state. On the other hand, if the inflow of immigrants is non–marginal
(i.e. ∆pi), the total remuneration of existing workers will rise (
∑
j ηj
wˆj
∆pi
≥ 0)27 and relax the
government’s budget constraint.28
4 Data
To empirically investigate these theoretical predictions, we combine individual-level infor-
mation on immigration attitudes with aggregate data on the characteristics of destination
countries. In particular, we use survey results from the 1995 National Identity Module of
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1995), which covers advanced, middle-
income and developing economies. We restrict the sample and only focus on higher-income
countries, which are the best suited for the analysis of welfare-state determinants. First, the
salience of migration issues is lower in countries with few immigrants and these tend to be
countries with lower income, which are the ones we exclude from our sample. In addition,
our sample selection excludes poorer countries in Eastern Europe which were in 1995 in the
early stages of the economic transition and for which a Western-style welfare state was just
beginning to emerge (see for instance Campos and Coricelli 2002).29
27These are the gains from migration pointed out by Berry and Soligo (1969) and Borjas (1995).
28In the theoretical model, we have considered three economic channels, i.e. the welfare-state one, the
labor-market one, and efficiency considerations. The assumptions in the model (small open economy, the
absence of a non-tradeable sector, and homothetic and identical preferences across individuals) imply that
we abstract from the price channel. That is, migration does not have a differential impact on various income
groups through price changes. In a more general model, immigration could have effects on commodity prices
– for example in the presence of a non–tradable sector – and individuals belonging to different income groups
might be characterized by different consumption baskets. Thus, in a general setup, heterogenous individuals
might have different preferences over immigration because of price effects. The only empirical paper we have
found on these issues is Cortes (2006), that uses highly disaggregated U.S. data at the city level. She finds
that immigration affects the prices of non traded goods and services, however her evidence suggests that
the effect of immigration on the cost of living indices does not differ substantially across income groups. In
particular, across US cities the average decrease in the cost of living due to immigration in the ninenties
is very similar for high school dropouts, high school graduates and college graduates (0.92, 0.94 and 0.96
percent, respectively, see Table 14 in the appendix of the paper).
29In particular, our sample includes countries with per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) in 1995 above 8,000
international dollars: West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, United States, Austria, Italy, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Spain, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovak Republic. Italy is excluded from regressions which use real income, as this variable is not available.
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To construct a measure of immigration attitudes, we use respondents’ answers in the
ISSP survey to the following question: “There are different opinions about immigrants from
other countries living in (respondent’s country). By “immigrants” we mean people who come
to settle in (respondent’s country). Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent’s
country) nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the same as
it is, (d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot”. The survey format also allows for “can’t
choose” and “not available” responses which we exclude from the sample. We also leave out
observations for individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis, Pro Immig Dummy, is dichotomous and
equal to one for respondents who would like the number of immigrants to increase (either
a little or a lot) and to zero otherwise.30 Our empirical analysis is based on estimation of
probit models (the Tables report coefficient estimates). All specifications have robust stan-
dard errors adjusted for clustering on country,31 to address heteroskedasticity and allow for
correlation across individual observations within the same country, and include destination
countries’ fixed effects,32 to account for the impact of unobserved, additive, country-specific
effects. These intercepts make it possible to net out the impact of country-level variables
which is homogeneous across fellow citizens (for example, the linear effect of migration pol-
icy, of the state of the economy, of the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants,
etc.33).
Summary statistics for Pro Immig Dummy and all the other ISSP and country-level
variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The fraction of
individuals in the overall sample who are in favor of immigration is low (7.9%). However,
this fraction hides substantial cross-country variation. In Canada and Ireland, respondents
30We have checked the robustness of our results to various alternatives with respect to how the dependent
variable is constructed (for example, keeping the “can’t choose” and “not available” observations; defining
the middle category (c) as pro-immigration; using as dependent variable a five-valued ordered measure; etc.).
31There is no consensus in the literature regarding whether standard errors should be simply “robust” or
also “clustered by country”. Therefore, we also run the regressions with standard errors set to be “robust”
and find very similar results.
32Fixed-effect estimation of a probit model may give rise to the so called incidental parameter problem
(Chamberlain 1984): the maximum-likelihood estimator of the incidental parameters (fixed effects) is con-
sistent as T →∞, for given N (assuming that there are T observations for each unit i = 1, ..., N) However,
it is inconsistent for given T , as N → ∞. Given that the panel data set we use is very long (N small, T
high, since there are many individual observations for each country), the incidental parameters problem is
not an issue in our case.
33Therefore, these country-level variables cannot be included in the estimating equations (unless inter-
acted with individual-level regressors) otherwise they would be perfectly collinear with the country dummy
variables.
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are the most pro-immigration, in Hungary the least. In contrast, attitudes are much more
favorable towards an alternative dimension of globalization, international trade. In the
overall sample, 28% of individuals welcome free trade, with the highest fraction being in the
Netherlands and the lowest one in Hungary.
Additional immigration questions are included in the ISSP survey. For example, indi-
viduals are asked whether they agree with the statement that immigration increases crime
rates and whether they think that immigration makes the country more open to new ideas
and cultures. We use answers to these questions to construct two variables, pro-immig crime
and pro-immig culture, which capture each individual’s perception of the security and cul-
tural impact of immigration, respectively. In some specifications we control for these two
regressors which measure two important aspects of the perceived non-economic impact of mi-
gration. By comparing two individuals who feel the same in terms of this dimension, we are
better able to isolate the economic channels. At the same time, when we include pro-immig
crime and pro-immig culture, we might be underestimating the effect of economic variables,
due to the possible endogeneity of the two variables: that is, an individual might be against
immigration for economic reasons and, as a consequence, express anti-immigration views
from a crime and cultural point of view.
The ISSP data set also includes information on a number of individual-level characteris-
tics that define the socio-economic background of each respondent (for example the age, sex,
number of years of education, real income, social class, political affiliation, and trade union
membership of the person interviewed). The two variables of interest for our analysis are
the individual’s number of years of education and real income. We use data on the former
to construct a measure of individual skill (education) and test the labor-market predictions
of the model. We employ data on individual real income to test instead the predictions on
welfare-state determinants. In particular, the variable income is calculated using data from
the ISSP data set on individual yearly income in local currency and purchasing-power-parity
conversion factors from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2001).34
The theoretical predictions about the impact of immigration on natives’ preferences,
through both the welfare-state and the labor-market channels, are different (indeed oppo-
site) depending on the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants in the destination
country. Following ?), we use two alternative measures of such skill mix. While the first
one is a direct measure, it can only be constructed for a limited number of countries, for
34See end of Table 2 for definitions of variables based on the ISSP questions.
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which the following data is available. We use information on 1995 education levels of both
native and immigrant populations, which comes from the International Migration Statistics
data set for OECD countries (OECD 1997). Education levels are coded according to the In-
ternational Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): 1. less than first stage of second
level (ISCED 00, 01, 0235); 2. completed second stage of second level (ISCED 03, 04); 3.
completed third level (ISCED 05 and over); 4. other general education, not applicable and
no answer. The relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is defined as the ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. We measure
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, for both natives and immigrants, as the number of
individuals with education levels 2. and 3. divided by the number of individuals with edu-
cation level 1. In particular, the variable we use in the regressions, relative skill ratio, equals
the log of (one plus) the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants.36 The higher
the relative skill ratio, the more unskilled immigrants are compared to natives.37
The indirect measure we employ for the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants
is the (log) per capita GDP of the destination country in 1995 (PPP-adjusted), from the
World Development Indicators. Consider the standard international migration model with
no productivity differences across countries. From a theoretical point of view, in this case
the relationship between destination countries’ per capita GDP and immigrants’ skill mix
(relative to natives) is unambiguous. High per capita GDP countries have a higher supply of
skilled to unskilled labor than low per capita GDP countries, therefore lower skilled wages
and higher unskilled wages. This creates an incentive for unskilled migrants to move from low
to high per capita GDP countries, while skilled migrants will tend to move in the opposite
direction. Therefore, this simple model predicts that the relative skill composition of natives
to immigrants is high in higher-income countries and low in lower-income countries. If we
drop the unrealistic assumption of equal technology levels across economies, the pattern
of international migration in terms of skill composition is ambiguous, since rates of return
can be higher - than in the rest of the world - for both types of labor in a technologically-
advanced country. Therefore, in general, the relationship between destination countries’
35ISCED level 02 usually refers to individuals who have completed the ninth grade.
36In terms of the notation in the theoretical model, the relative skill ratio equals log(1 + βU/βS) where
βU/βS > 1 if and only if βU > 1 (this is the case of unskilled immigration).
37The relative skill ratio measure is likely to understate the actual skill level of natives to immigrants, in
all countries, for two reasons. First, the immigration statistics used are for legal migration. Second, educated
immigrants often work in occupations that require lower skills than their education level.
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per capita GDP and the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants becomes an
empirical question. Based on a sample of fourteen countries, for which data on both variables
is available (OECD 1997), Mayda (2006, Figure 1) shows that per-capita GDP in 1995 is
indeed positively and significantly correlated with the relative skill composition for the same
year. Based on this evidence, we can therefore use per capita GDP levels as a proxy for the
relative skill mix. Our first set of estimates (Table 4) is based on the latter indirect measure,
as it is available for a larger number of countries. Robustness checks in Table 6 use the direct
measure for the relative skill composition described above.
We also test the predictions of our model using information on the size of destination
countries’ welfare states (labor tax rates and per capita benefits), which comes from two
sources. Data on labor tax rates are taken from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), as
extended by Milesi–Ferretti, Mendoza, and Asea (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). To
compute average labor income tax rates, these papers use fiscal revenue statistics. Figures
on per capita transfers are taken from Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) and are based on
the OECD analytical database. Per capita transfers include both social security and other
transfers, such as unemployment and disability compensation, and are deflated using each
country’s CPI, and expressed in 1990 PPP equivalent dollars.
In order to measure how redistributive a welfare system is, we construct an indicator of
the progressivity of the tax system in the host countries, which is based on data from OECD
(1998). In particular, we use information on average income tax rates (that is, personal
income tax due as a fraction of gross wage earnings) for single individuals without children
who earn, respectively, 67% and 167% of the annual wage earnings of an average production
worker (see Table 1 in OECD (1998)). Our measure of the progressivity of the tax system,
progressivity, equals the difference in tax rates applied to these two groups.
Finally, we complement our investigation based on the ISSP survey using an additional
individual-level data set, the 2002-2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS), which
covers a different (and larger) sample of countries than the ISSP38 and was run in a different
period of time.39 The immigration question we examine in the ESS data set is also more
specific than the one contained in the ISSP, as it focuses on immigrants of the same race or
38As with the ISSP data set, we restrict the ESS sample and only focus on higher-income countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary.
39For more information on the construction of the survey, see Jovell and al. (2003). The data are available
from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.
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ethnic group as the majority in the country.40 The main advantage of this more narrowly
phrased question is that it abstracts from racial and ethnic considerations, which could bias
the estimates on individual skill and income. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the ESS
data set is that the income variable is not continuous, therefore it is subject to measurement
error.41
As before, we exclude non-nationals from the sample and construct a dichotomous vari-
able, Pro Immig Dummy-ESS, which equals one if the individual would like many or some
immigrants (of the same race and ethnic group as the majority), zero otherwise (that is,
if the individual would like a few immigrants or none). Summary statistics of Pro Immig
Dummy-ESS and the other ESS variables included in the regressions are presented in Table
8. The different picture these numbers portray relative to the ISSP data set - in particular,
the higher fraction of individuals in favor of migration - is not surprising given that in the
ESS survey the immigration question is asked in relation to immigrants of the same race and
ethnic group as the majority.
Using Pro Immig Dummy-ESS as the dependent variable, we estimate probit models
which include, as regressors, country dummy variables and have robust standard errors
clustered by country.42 We combine the European Social Survey with aggregate statistics
on the destination countries of immigrant flows. Data on per capita GDP of the destination
country in 2002 (PPP-adjusted) have been obtained from the World Development Indicators
data set. The relative skill ratio variable is constructed using 2002-2003 data on native and
immigrant populations by level of education (lower secondary education, upper secondary,
tertiary) from Table I.12 in SOPEMI (2005).
5 Empirical Results
As the theoretical model shows, the impact of immigration on natives’ preferences through
the welfare-state channel is a function of individual income. On the other hand, the effect
of immigration on natives’ attitudes through the labor-market channel is a function of in-
dividual skill. In our empirical specifications, we will use both variables to disentangle the
40In particular, the survey asks: ”To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same
race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? 1. Allow many immigrants to come
and live here; 2 Allow some; 3 Allow a few; 4 Allow none; 7 Refusal; 8 Don’t know; 9 No answer.”
41See definition of income at the end of Table 8.
42As recommended in the ESS website, our estimation uses both design and population size weights.
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Relative
skill com-
position
skilled immigration unskilled immigration
Channel Labor
Market
Welfare State Labor
Market
Welfare State
Tax Ad-
justment
Model
Benefit
Adjust-
ment
Model
Tax Ad-
justment
Model
Benefit
Adjust-
ment
Model
Corr. b/w
Attitudes
& Skill
Negative Positive
Corr. b/w
Attitudes
& Income
Positive Negative Negative Positive
Table 1: Correlations between pro-immigration attitudes and, respectively, skill and income
through the labor–market and the welfare–state channels.
two effects. Notice that, besides employment income, our individual level measure of real
income also includes interests and dividends, rents received on real estate and the like. Thus,
while not surprisingly individual income and individual skill are positively and significantly
correlated,43 they are far from being perfectly collinear, which makes it possible to analyze
them in conjunction.
In particular, the theoretical models in Section 3 derive the following predictions. Through
the welfare-state channel, if per capita transfers are fixed, tax rates are adjustable and the
tax system is redistributive (tax adjustment model), the more aﬄuent an individual is, the
less favorable he should be to immigration if he resides in a country where natives are on
average more skilled than immigrants. Thus, in such countries, the relationship between
individual income and pro-immigration attitudes should be negative. On the other hand,
according to the tax adjustment model, richer households should favor immigration more
than poorer households in countries characterized by skilled migration. Therefore, in such
countries, we would expect a positive correlation between individual income and opinions in
favor of immigrants (Proposition 1). Next, under the benefit adjustment model - that is, if
the adjustment in the fiscal position of the welfare state to immigration takes place through
changes in per capita welfare benefits with tax rates kept fixed - still assuming a redistribu-
tive tax system, the correlations between income and pro-immigration attitudes should have
43Their correlation coefficient in the overall ISSP sample is 0.34 (significant at the 1% level).
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exactly the opposite signs for each type of skill mix of natives to immigrants. We should
observe a positive relationship between income and pro-immigration attitudes in countries
with unskilled immigrants relative to natives and a negative relationship in countries with
skilled immigrants relative to natives (Proposition 2). Finally, through the labor-market
channel, skilled individuals should be more favorable to immigrants than unskilled ones in
destinations characterized by unskilled immigration. The opposite is true for countries where
immigrants are skilled relative to natives. These predictions are summarized in Table 1.
We bring these theoretical predictions to the data in Tables 4 through 7. We investigate
the empirical validity on average44 of either one of the two welfare-state models, controlling
for the impact of labor-market effects.
Our initial set of regressions (columns (1)-(4), Table 4), where we assume a common
coefficient on individual-level variables across countries, illustrate basic patterns in the data.
Ceteris paribus, older individuals and women are less likely to favor immigrant inflows,
even though the latter effect is not always significant. These first results also show that it
is problematic to analyze the welfare-state variable on its own, independently from labor-
market and non-economic determinants of immigration attitudes. Richer individuals are
usually better educated than poorer ones, which has implications for their position in the
labor market and for their view of immigration from a cultural and security point of view.
For example, controlling only for the age and gender of the respondent, we estimate a positive
and significant coefficient on income in regression (1). However, once we also account for
the impact of individual skill (equation (2)) and of other non-economic determinants of
immigration preferences which are correlated with income (pro-immig crime and pro-immig
culture in regression (3); upper social class, trade union member, political affiliation with the
right in regression (4)), the effect of income becomes insignificant.
We next let the coefficients on individual skill and income change by country, as suggested
by the theory (regressions (5)-(7)). In these regressions, we use per capita GDP as a proxy
for the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants. Since data on per capita GDP is available
for all countries analyzed, the sample size is not affected. In particular, in column (6), we
44In our analysis, due to the low number of country observations, we assume that all countries either
follow the first model or the second one. In other words, we test the validity of each model on average across
countries.
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estimate the following probit model:45
Prob(ProImmigDummyi = 1 | xi) =
= Φ(β1agei + β2malei + β3incomei + β4incomei · pcgdpc + β5educi + β6educi · pcgdpc),
where Φ(·) represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard Normal, β is
a vector of parameters to be estimated and xi is the vector of all explanatory variables
specific to individual i, who is from country c. In regression (7), we augment this spec-
ification by adding the two regressors pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture. Based on
these specifications, we find evidence of substantial cross-country heterogeneity in terms of
the impact of both skill and income. The effect of the two variables is characterized by
the opposite pattern across countries. Our estimates show that, while the impact of educa-
tion on pro-immigration preferences is positive in higher per-capita GDP countries (β6 > 0)
and negative in lower per-capita GDP countries (β5 < 0), the effect of individual income
is negative in higher per-capita GDP countries (β4 < 0) and positive in lower per-capita
GDP countries (β3 > 0).
46 Therefore, our results are consistent with a labor-market plus
welfare-state explanation of attitudes towards immigrants in a framework characterized by
fixed welfare benefits, adjustable welfare costs (tax rates) and a redistributive fiscal system
(tax adjustment model).
We confirm that the estimated coefficients in regression (7) imply the above-stated effects
for countries in our sample, that is that the threshold values of per capita GDP such that
the correlations change sign fall within the range of values in our sample. We find that
pcgdp∗E such that (β5educi + β6educi · pcgdp∗E) = 0 equals $12,809 and that pcgdp∗I such
that (β3incomei + β4incomei · pcgdp∗I) = 0 equals $21,869. These threshold values are
also consistent with Table 5 which reports the marginal effects of education and income at
different values of GDP per capita (the marginal effects are based on the coefficient estimates
of regression (7)).47 We find that, for example, while in the United States doubling real
45This specification, as well as all the other ones in the paper, also includes country dummy variables as
regressors.
46Using the coefficient estimates of regression (7), we calculate the marginal effects for income and
education and their interaction variables and find that they are of the same sign as the corresponding
coefficients. To calculate the marginal effects of interaction variables, we use the Stata command predictnl
which gets around the problems pointed out in Ai and Norton (2003).
47To calculate the marginal effects of education and income, we have used Clarify. This is a routine which
draws 1000 sets of coefficients from a multivariate normal with mean equal to the maximum likelihood coef-
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income decreases the probability that the respondent is pro-immigration by 0.5 percentage
points, in the Slovak Republic it increases it by 6. In the United States, one more year
of education raises the likelihood by 1 percentage point, whereas in the Slovak Republic it
decreases it by 1.1 percentage points. While these numbers appear small, they are large in
relation to the mean of the dependent variable which is only 7.9 percentage points.
Next, we use the marginal effects from Table 5 in Figure 1, which provides additional
evidence on the cross-country pattern of the impact of skill and income. In particular, we
plot the estimated marginal effects of education (income) on the top (bottom) panel of Figure
1 as a function of the 1995 per capita GDP of the destination country. The top graph shows
a positive and significant (at the 1% level) correlation between the host country’s per capita
GDP and the size of the effect of education (as in Mayda 2006). On the other hand, the
bottom graph displays the opposite type of pattern, a negative and significant (at the 1%
level) correlation between the destination country’s per capita GDP and the marginal effect
of income. In other words, the richer the destination country, the more positive the impact of
individual skill on pro-immigration attitudes and the more negative the impact of individual
income.
Based on the regressors of this specification (regression (7), Table 4), we also investigate
the relative importance of labor-market and welfare-state determinants of attitudes. We
estimate a linear (OLS) regression using the ordered variable Immig Opinion as the depen-
dent variable.48 We start with a specification which only includes the socio-demographic,
non-economic and labor-market regressors (age, male, educ, educ*pcgdp, pro-immig crime,
pro-immig culture plus country dummy variables) and next add the welfare-state variables
(income, income*pcgdp). The difference between the two R2 measures is the fraction of
the total variance which is explained by public-finance drivers, after accounting for the
contribution of socio-demographic, non-economic and labor-market determinants plus coun-
ficient estimates (the beta hats) and variance equal to the variance covariance matrix of these estimates. For
each of the 1000 sets of parameters, Clarify calculates two probabilities: first, the predicted pro-immigration
probability when all the individual level variables are equal to their overall sample means and the aggregate
level variables are equal to each country’s specific values (each country’s per capita GDP and coefficient
on the country dummy variable); second, the predicted pro-immigration probability when either the real
income measure is doubled or the measure of education is augmented by one unit, while all other individual
level characteristics are held fixed. Clarify then computes the difference between the latter and the former
predicted probabilities. Finally, Clarify provides the sample mean – which represents the marginal effect –
standard errors and corresponding confidence intervals over the distribution of 1000 values of the difference
in probabilities.
48Immig Opinion ranges from 1=“reduced a lot” to 5=“increased a lot”.
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try dummy variables. If we repeat the same exercise including first the socio-demographic,
non-economic and welfare-state regressors plus country dummy variables, and next the labor-
market variables, the R2 increases by slightly more than before.49 Therefore, while this paper
uncovers the significant role played by public-finance issues across countries, it also finds that
labor-market determinants are marginally more important than welfare-state variables, in
terms of variance explained.
In Table 6, we check the robustness of our results in a number of ways.50 First, in place
of per capita GDP, we use the direct measure of the relative skill composition of natives
to immigrants described in Section 4 (regressions (1)-(2)).51 Although these estimates are
based on a smaller sample of countries due to data limitations52, they are characterized by
the same sign patterns as those using per capita GDP and by the same levels of significance
(this is true for both the labor-market and welfare-state variables). Based on specification
(2), the estimates for income (0.1411 significant at the 10% level) and income*relative skill
ratio (-0.1643 significant at the 5% level) imply that individuals from countries with relative
skill composition above approximately 1.36 are less likely to be in favor of immigration the
higher their income, while in countries with relative skill composition below this threshold
(Ireland, Spain, Sweden in our sample), the correlation between pro-immigration attitudes
and income is positive.53 Using the coefficient estimates of regression (2), we calculate the
marginal effects of education and income at different values of the relative skill composition
(Table 7). Figure 2, which plots the two sets of marginal effects as a function of the relative
skill composition, provides evidence which is very similar to what we find in Figure 1.
Our next robustness checks exploit the variation across countries in the size and pro-
gressivity of the welfare state. In regressions (3)-(5), Table 6, we follow Hanson, Scheve,
49The difference in the two changes of R2 is half of a percentage point.
50For numerous additional robustness checks of the labor-market results, see Mayda (2006). For example,
Mayda (2006) shows that the correlation between education and pro-immigration preferences disappears if
the sample is restricted to individuals out of the labor force. This says that the effect of skill is indeed
working through the labor-market channel. The labor-market results are also confirmed when data on
individual occupation is used: respondents in occupations which experience a higher inflow of immigrants
are less likely to be pro-immigration (Mayda 2006).
51The skill composition of immigrants is shaped by migration policy which, in turn, is a function of
attitudes. However, in an individual-level analysis such as this one, reverse causality is not an issue, since
each individual has an infinitesimal impact on the aggregate policy outcome.
52Regressions (1) and (2) are based on the following countries: Germany West, Germany East, Great
Britain, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Spain.
53Notice that these results are qualitatively similar when we interact each of the four main terms with the
1995 size of the immigrant inflow, as a fraction of the destination country’s population.
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and Slaughter (2007) and estimate specifications where we use education as a proxy for the
level of both individual skill and individual income. In order to differentiate between the
labor-market hypothesis and the welfare-state one, we use data on the size and progressivity
of the welfare state in each destination country. In particular, in column (3), we estimate
the following probit model:54
Prob(ProImmigDummyi = 1 | xi) =
= Φ(γ1agei+γ2malei+γ3educi+γ4educi·RSRc+γ5educi·benefitsc+γ6educi·RSRc·benefitsc),
where RSR stands for relative skill ratio and benefits represents per capita benefits in
1995. The two terms γ3educi and γ4educi ·RSRc capture the labor-market effect, while the
following two terms (γ5educi · benefitsc and γ6educi ·RSRc · benefitsc) provide evidence on
the welfare-state channel. If the welfare state is relatively small in a destination country
(for example, benefits are equal to zero), we expect the effect of education to reflect only
labor-market considerations. That is, we should find that the impact of education is positive
in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants on average (γ4 > 0) and negative
viceversa (γ3 < 0). On the other hand, the bigger the size of a destination country’s welfare
state, the more important welfare-state determinants should be in shaping preferences, and
therefore the more likely it is that the effect of education is consistent with Propositions 1
or 2.55 Recall that, using direct information on income, we found results consistent with
the tax adjustment model, where per capita benefits are assumed to be fixed and tax rates
adjust following immigration (Proposition 1): in this case, higher-income individuals oppose
unskilled immigrants and favor skilled ones. Therefore, in regression (3), we should find
γ6 < 0 and γ5 > 0. These are indeed the signs of the terms in education in regression
(3). These estimates are based on a limited number of countries, but they provide evidence
which is consistent with our previous results, thus confirming their robustness. The two sets
of determinants - labor-market and welfare-state ones - produce opposite results in terms of
the impact of education.
The latter findings are confirmed in specification (4) that uses an alternative measure
of the size of the welfare state, i.e. labor tax rates. We find that, if labor tax rates are
54This specification, as all the other ones in the paper, also includes country dummy variables as regressors.
55In addition, the theoretical model predicts that the income-distribution effects of welfare-state variables
should be more pronounced the larger the size of the welfare state (see equations (12) and (14)).
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low, the coefficient on education is consistent with the labor-market hypothesis (negative
and positive in correspondence of, respectively, skilled and unskilled migration) but has the
opposite signs if labor tax rates are high, once again strengthening our previous results.
Finally, we investigate the same set of issues by differentiating countries according to the
progressivity of their tax system (regression (5), Table 6). The theoretical model predicts
that the income-distribution effects of welfare-state variables should be more pronounced
the more redistributive the tax system is (see equations (12) and (14)).56 On the contrary,
with zero redistribution, the labor-market channel should prevail, even in countries with
sizeable welfare states. Our estimates in specification (5) are, once again, consistent with
these implications and with our previous results. To conclude, we believe that our main
specifications and additional robustness checks provide strong empirical evidence for the
interaction of labor-market drivers of preferences with welfare-state ones, along the lines of
the tax adjustment model.
In the last column of Table 6 we consider respondents’ preferences with respect to an
alternative dimension of globalization, free trade of goods and services. We use the same
regressors as in regression (1), Table 6 with Pro Trade Dummy as the dependent variable.57
Our goal is to investigate whether cleavages in trade attitudes mirror those for immigration.
If that was the case, we might worry that our results are not driven by the welfare-state
channel since trade openness is not likely to have as large an impact as immigration on
public finances in advanced countries.58 In any case, even if this were not true - that is,
trade liberalization significantly affects the welfare state59 - we do not expect the effect of
public-finance issues on trade preferences to be a function of the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants. As our results on trade preferences in regression (6), Table 6 show,
the effects estimated in our previous regressions are indeed specific to immigration attitudes.
Finally, the results based on the ESS data set offer empirical evidence which is remark-
ably similar to what we found using the ISSP survey. As the estimates in Table 9 show,
individual attitudes towards immigrants in the ESS sample are on average consistent with
the tax adjustment model (the coefficient on income is positive and negative given, respec-
56Of course, our underlying assumption is that a more progressive tax system is more redistributive.
57See definition of Pro Trade Dummy at the end of Table 2.
58As Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) note, “immigrants may pay taxes, may receive public services,
and may vote over tax and spending choices. Imports, obviously, do none of these things.” (p. 1). In general,
the fiscal costs of trade adjustment assistance programs are limited.
59An alternative view is that trade liberalization has a considerable impact on the welfare state since the
demand for social insurance increases with free trade (Rodrik 1998).
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tively, skilled and unskilled migration) and with labor-market determinants (the coefficient
on education is negative and positive given, respectively, skilled and unskilled migration).
To conclude, given the difference in country coverage of the sample, in the questionnaire
date and wording of the immigration question relative to the ISSP survey, the ESS results
represent an important robustness check of the conclusions of this paper.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple theoretical framework to study the effect of a
redistributive welfare state on individual attitudes towards immigration. We have highlighted
that this effect depends in a fundamental way on how the welfare state adjusts to an inflow of
foreign workers. In particular, we have shown that high income individuals are worse hit by
unskilled immigration only if taxes are raised to maintain per capita transfers unchanged (tax
adjustment model). At the same time, agents at the bottom of the income distribution will
suffer more with unskilled immigration if tax rates are kept constant and the adjustment
is carried out through a reduction in the per capita transfers (benefit adjustment model).
These relationships are reversed in the case of skilled migration.
Using two different surveys of individual attitudes towards migrants, we have brought the
predictions of the two models to the data. Differently from the existing literature, we have
carried out our investigation taking full advantage of both the cross-country and individual-
level variation in the data. The results we obtain are on average consistent with the tax
adjustment model, i.e. with an adjustment to immigration that is carried out through changes
in the tax rates. In particular, we find that high income individuals oppose immigration
through this channel in countries where immigration is unskilled and therefore a net burden
to the welfare state. The data suggest an opposite pattern when migration is skilled. In this
case the correlation between income and pro-immigration preferences is positive, which is
consistent with a situation where migrants are perceived as net contributors to the welfare
state.
More generally, we find that the income distribution effects of immigration as perceived
by individuals are less pronounced than pointed out in the existing literature. Individual skill
and income have opposite effects on individual attitudes. Since skill and income are positively
correlated, the labor market and welfare state channels partially offset each other. For
example, the very same skilled and high income German businessman may feel ambivalent
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regarding the arrival of unskilled immigrants since he might benefit from hiring them (labor
market complementarity) but be hurt by paying their way through the welfare state.
Finally, in our model we have used the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants
to capture whether immigration will be a net burden or contribution for the public finances of
the host countries. In practice, while unskilled labor flows are likely to represent a net burden,
the same young immigrants have been portrayed by some as the answer to the deteriorating
conditions of the welfare state in destinations with aging populations. In particular, in many
OECD economies, pay as you go social security systems are the main vehicle through which
retirement benefits are paid. Thus, another interesting question to consider is how differences
in the age structure and fertility rates of natives relative to immigrants can affect individual
attitudes towards immigration. This question represents an important direction for future
research.
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7 Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. Notice that, absent labor market effects and holding the demogrant constant,
equation (9) implies
Iˆ
dpi
= − Gτ
b+G(1− τ)
[
τˆ
dpi
]
From equation (11) we know that if immigration is unskilled, τˆ
dpi
> 0 and thus Iˆ
dpi
< 0.
The opposite is true if immigration is skilled and ηE < η
∗
E. To assess the effect of different
individual income levels, notice that
∂
(
Iˆ
dpi
)
∂G
= − τˆ
dpi
{
bτ
[b+G(1− τ)]2
}
.
If immigration is unskilled, which implies τˆ
dpi
> 0, then
∂
“
Iˆ
dpi
”
∂G
≤ 0. On the other hand, if
immigration is skilled, from equation (11) we know that τˆ
dpi
< 0 as long as ηE <
(1−βU )(φU−ηU )
(1−ψU )
and, as a result,
∂
“
Iˆ
dpi
”
∂G
≥ 0. ¤
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A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. Without labor market effects and holding the tax rates unchanged, equation (9)
becomes
Iˆ
dpi
=
b bˆ
dpi
b+G(1− τ)
To assess the effects of different individual income levels, notice that
∂
(
Iˆ
dpi
)
∂G
= − b
bˆ
dpi
(1− τ)
[b+G(1− τ)]2 .
We have seen that with a redistributive tax system, unskilled immigration leads to a reduc-
tion in the per capita transfers ( bˆ
dpi
< 0) therefore
∂
“
Iˆ
dpi
”
∂G
≥ 0. With skilled immigration,
bˆ
dpi
> 0 as long as ηE <
(1−βU )(φU−ηU )
(1−ψU ) and therefore
∂
“
Iˆ
dpi
”
∂G
< 0. ¤
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pro-immig dummy 13605 0.0786 0.2691 0.0000 1.0000
pro-trade dummy 7966 0.2797 0.4489 0.0000 1.0000
age 13605 44.7291 16.0457 14.0000 96.0000
male 13605 0.5048 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000
log of real income 13605 9.1908 1.2025 3.9616 11.6643
education (years of education) 13605 12.0949 3.4868 1.0000 20.0000
pro-immig crime 13605 0.2711 0.4445 0.0000 1.0000
pro-immig culture 13605 0.5130 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000
upper social class 6364 3.4239 1.0982 1.0000 6.0000
trade union member 6364 0.4419 0.4966 0.0000 1.0000
political affiliation with the right 6364 2.8914 0.9559 1.0000 5.0000
Summary statistics for pro-immig dummy , age , male , log of real income , education , pro-immig crime , pro-immig culture are
based on the same observations as in regressions (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) in Table 4.
Summary statistics for upper social class , trade union member , political affiliation with the right are based on the same
observations as regression (4) in Table 4.
pro-immig crime is based on responses to the following question: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following
statement? Immigrants increase crime rates: 1=agree strongly; 5=disagree strongly." pro-immig crime =1 if answers to the above
question are either (4) or (5); 0 otherwise. pro-immig culture is based on responses to the following question: "How much do you
agree or disagree with the following statement? Immigrants make (respondent's country) more open to new ideas and cultures:
1=disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly." pro-immig culture =1 if answers to the above questions are either (4) or (5); 0 otherwise.
Summary statistics for pro-trade dummy  are based on the same observations as regression (6) in Table 6.
Table 2. Summary statistics of individual-level variables (ISSP data set)
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 female (i.e., missing values are excluded). log of real income is calculated using data in local
currency on individual yearly income from the ISSP-NI data set and purchasing-power-parity conversion factors from the WDI
(World Bank). upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower, 2=working, 3=lower middle, 4=middle, 5=upper middle, 6=upper.
trade union member equals one if the individual is a member of a trade union, zero if he is not. political affiliation with the right is 
coded as follows: 1=far left, 2=centre left, 3=centre, 4=right, 5=far right.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pro Trade Dummy is based on responses to the following question: "Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations
between (respondent's country) and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(respondent's country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy: 1=agree strongly;
5=disagree strongly; can't choose; NA." Pro Trade Dummy =1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 if they are
either (1),(2), or (3). Can't choose and NA are treated as missing values.
Pro Immig Dummy is based on responses to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent's
country) nowadays should be ...: reduced a lot (1), reduced a little (2), remain the same as it is (3), increased a little (4), increased a
lot (5); can't choose; NA." Pro Immig Dummy =1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 if they are either (1),(2) or
(3). Can't choose and NA are treated as missing values.
R
R
country
pro-immig 
dummy
pro-trade 
dummy education
log of real 
income
per capita 
gdp
relative skill 
composition benefits progressivity labor tax rate
United States 0.0805 0.1326 13.4257 9.6637 27395 3350 8.0000 29.1050
Norway 0.0743 0.2920 12.6633 9.6180 24694 5374 11.3000 40.6000
Japan 0.1568 0.3600 11.8682 9.6473 23212 7645 5.8000 29.3630
Canada 0.2061 0.2855 14.7612 9.9558 23085 1.6709 2433 11.9000 30.3440
Austria 0.0395 0.1679 10.3555 9.2601 22090 2.5329 6181 10.4000 39.6070
Germany West 0.0282 0.3854 10.9086 9.4788 21479 4.0923 4438 12.9000 40.2100
Germany East 0.0199 0.2312 10.9497 9.1904 21479 4.0923 4438 12.9000 40.2100
Netherlands 0.0547 0.3930 12.6851 9.9000 20812 2.6941 7166 15.9000 49.7960
Italy 0.0355 0.2315 11.0284 . 20513 0.6374 3475 8.8000 42.1830
Sweden 0.0671 0.2468 11.4111 9.5651 20031 1.3362 5879 11.0000 53.0110
Great Britain 0.0413 0.1433 11.3209 9.8841 19465 2.2523 2163 6.0000 24.5040
New Zealand 0.1159 0.2513 14.3098 9.5682 17706 2705 5.8000 24.9920
Ireland 0.1910 0.2260 12.2490 9.1528 17264 0.3950 2370 15.5000              
Spain 0.0844 0.1107 10.1275 9.0672 15163 0.4668 1899 10.0000 36.9000
Slovenia 0.0186 0.2619 10.6766 8.7888 12978              
Czech Republic 0.0244 0.2778 12.9111 8.6610 12426 4.9000              
Hungary 0.0148 0.0992 10.4914 8.1421 9315 16.9000              
Slovak Republic 0.0302 0.2566 11.8364 5.9451 8487              
gdp is the per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars). The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native
relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with
levels 2 and 3 of education to the number of individuals with level 1 of education. The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995. benefits is per
capita transfers in 1995. progressivity is equal to the difference in average income tax rates applied to single individuals without children who earn, respectively,
167% and 67% of the annual wage earnings of an average production worker (OECD 1998). labor tax rate is the 1990 labor tax rate. See end of Table 2 for
definitions of pro-immig dummy , pro-trade dummy , education  and log of real income .
Table 3.  Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country (ISSP data set) and of country-level variables
R
Probit with country dummy variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable
age -0.0074 -0.0035 -0.0031 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0034
0.0017** 0.0014* 0.0015* 0.0025+ 0.0015** 0.0015* 0.0015*
male 0.0474 0.0739 0.1062 0.0609 0.0773 0.0756 0.1063
0.0412 0.0413+ 0.0414* 0.0614 0.0419+ 0.0419+ 0.0425*
log of real income 0.1243 0.0192 0.0205 -0.0032 0.0206 2.0979 2.3693
0.0385** 0.0381 0.0418 0.0622 0.0382 1.0828+ 1.0895*
log of real income*gdp -0.2099 -0.2371
0.1102+ 0.1107*
education (years of education) 0.073 0.0512 0.0697 -1.0792 -1.2332 -1.169
0.0133** 0.0112** 0.0169** 0.4279* 0.4315** 0.4205**
education*gdp 0.1168 0.1324 0.1236
0.0435** 0.0439** 0.0428**
pro-immig crime 0.5016 0.498
0.0783** 0.0801**
pro-immig culture 0.5913 0.593
0.0876** 0.0883**
upper social class 0.0426
0.0237+
trade union member 0.0086
0.0505
political affiliation with the right -0.1561
0.0566**
Observations 13605 13605 13605 6364 13605 13605 13605
Pseudo R-squared 0.1 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18
Pro Immig Dummy
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the
constant is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
See end of Tables 2 and 3 for definitions of variables. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects.
Table 4. Welfare-state and labor-market determinants using an indirect  measure of the relative skill composition (ISSP data set)
countryname marginal effect of education marginal effect of log real income per capita GDP
USA 0.0091  [0.0069 0.0116] -0.0046  [-0.0117 0.0019] 27395
Norway 0.0093  [0.0073 0.0116] -0.0031  [-0.0098 0.0035] 24694
Japan 0.0179  [0.0142 0.0217] -0.0035  [-0.0163 0.0094] 23212
Canada 0.0110  [0.0091 0.0132] -0.0020  [-0.0098 0.0058] 23085
Austria 0.0060  [0.0043 0.0080] -0.0002  [-0.0044 0.0042] 22090
Germany West 0.0030  [0.0020 0.0042] 0.0002 [-0.0019 0.0024] 21479
Germany East 0.0025  [0.0014 0.0040] 0.0002  [-0.0016 0.0020] 21479
Netherlands 0.0040  [0.0031 0.0051] 0.0007  [-0.0023 0.0037] 20812
Sweden 0.0057  [0.0043 0.0073] 0.0021  [-0.0025 0.0069] 20031
Great Britain 0.0035  [0.0023 0.0050] 0.0017  [-0.0014 0.0050] 19465
New Zealand 0.0052  [0.0036 0.0069] 0.0064  [-0.0001 0.0133] 17706
Ireland 0.0066  [0.0046 0.0089] 0.0102  [0.0003 0.0203] 17264
Spain 0.0033  [0.0009 0.0058] 0.0139  [0.0033 0.0257] 15163
Slovenia 0.0001  [-0.0009 0.0012] 0.0077  [0.0016 0.0156] 12978
Czech Republic -0.0003  [-0.0022 0.0015] 0.0138  [0.0028 0.0271] 12426
Hungary -0.0027  [-0.0055 -0.0004] 0.0198  [0.0027 0.0434] 9315
Slovak Republic -0.0113  [-0.0231 -0.0023] 0.0634  [0.0082 0.1424] 8487
Table 5. The country-specific impact of education and income on immigration attitudes (ISSP data set)
This Table presents the marginal effects (and corresponding 90% confidence intervals in brackets) of education and log real income, country by country
(ISSP data set). To calculate the marginal effects of education and log real income , we have used Clarify and have set all the individual-level variables equal
to their overall-sample means (see Table 2). For the aggregate-level variables we have used each country's specific values, that is each country's per capita
GDP and coefficient on the country dummy variable. The marginal effects in this Table are based on the coefficient estimates of regression (7), Table 4.
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Probit with country dummy variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable ProTrade
age -0.0054 -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0006
0.0023* 0.0020* 0.0020* 0.0023* 0.0019* 0.0013
male 0.0381 0.0803 0.0705 0.063 0.0728 0.321
0.0521 0.0616 0.0456 0.0552 0.0469 0.0384**
log of real income 0.137 0.1411 0.1203
0.0620* 0.0770+ 0.0434**
log of real income*relative skill ratio -0.1545 -0.1643 0.0574
0.0661* 0.0774* 0.0552
education (years of education) -0.024 -0.0382 -0.5194 -0.4269 -0.0723 0.0391
0.0082** 0.0076** 0.1715** 0.0990** 0.0434+ 0.0141**
education*relative skill ratio 0.1063 0.1006 0.5254 0.5012 0.2429 0.0359
0.0103** 0.0109** 0.3194+ 0.1023** 0.0534** 0.0096**
education*benefits 0.065
0.0210**
education*relative skill ratio*benefits -0.0551
0.0379
education*labor tax rate 0.0105
0.0024**
education*relative skill ratio*labor tax rate -0.0102
0.0024**
education*progressivity 0.0043
0.0032
education*relative skill ratio*progressivity -0.0112
0.0037**
pro-immig crime 0.488
0.0815**
pro-immig culture 0.6087
0.1411**
Observations 7641 7641 10451 9539 10451 7966
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.1
Pro Immig Dummy
Table 6. Welfare-state and labor-market determinants using a direct  measure of the relative skill composition (ISSP data set)
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the
constant is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition. See end of Tables 2, 3 for
definitions of variables.
country marginal effect of education marginal effect of log real income relative skill composition
Germany West 0.0064  [0.0044 0.0089] -0.0047  [-0.0093 -0.0002] 4.0923
Germany East 0.0050 [0.0027 0.0081] -0.0036  [-0.0073 -0.0001] 4.0923
Netherlands 0.0068 [0.0054 0.0083] -0.0046  [-0.0100 0.0008] 2.6941
Austria 0.0088 [0.0064 0.0115] -0.0055  [-0.0123 0.0013] 2.5329
Great Britain 0.0069  [0.0045 0.0097] -0.0040  [-0.0106 0.0017] 2.2523
Canada 0.0108  [0.0087 0.0130] -0.0034   [-0.0142 0.0071] 1.6709
Sweden 0.0057 [0.0040 0.0077] 0.0003  [-0.0067 0.0074] 1.3362
Spain 0.0001  [-0.0030 0.0037] 0.0145  [-0.0002 0.0321] 0.4668
Ireland -0.0010  [-0.0051 0.0032] 0.0195  [0.0005 0.0401] 0.3950
Table 7. The country-specific impact of education and income on immigration attitudes (ISSP data set)
This Table presents the marginal effects (and corresponding 90% confidence intervals in brackets) of education and log real income, country by
country (ISSP data set). To calculate the marginal effects of education and log real income , we have used Clarify and have set all the individual-
level variables equal to their overall-sample means (see Table 2). For the aggregate-level variables we have used each country's specific values,
that is each country's relative skill composition and coefficient on the country dummy variable. The marginal effects in this Table are based on the
coefficient estimates of regression (2), Table 6.
1.36
0.46
R
pro-immig dummy 29248 0.6451 0.4785 0.0000 1.0000
year of birth 29248 1955 18 1893 1988
male 29248 0.4838 0.4997 0.0000 1.0000
real income 29248 2.8104 1.7746 0.1111 12.0000
education (highest level attained) 29248 2.9800 1.4845 0.0000 6.0000
country
pro-immig 
dummy education real income
per capita 
gdp
relative skill 
composition benefits
Luxembourg 0.5429 2.6379 3.4873 59977 2.0547 8310.9470
Ireland 0.7775 2.7174 1.8867 35653 0.4043 3587.3380
Norway 0.7119 3.4791 3.7711 34750 1.4222 6951.4750
Switzerland 0.7981 3.2322 4.5611 31020 5.1932 7505.3120
Netherlands 0.6310 2.9866 3.4162 29550 1.6595 5543.4070
Austria 0.4276 3.2512 3.0337 29015 3.1415 6189.7400
Denmark 0.7482 3.1962 3.5789 28957 1.1638 7317.9740
Belgium 0.6764 3.0236 2.8084 27459 1.8042 5709.0030
United Kingdom 0.6345 2.9809 3.7550 27176 2.0380 5042.1450
France 0.6331 2.9979 2.3630 26613 3.5085 6309.9100
Sweden 0.8866 2.9907 3.2947 26468 1.4150 6587.4060
Finland 0.5808 2.8742 3.2209 26018 1.2446 5775.8980
Italy 0.7053 2.3389 2.2621 25554 . 5269.5770
Germany 0.7188 3.3340 3.2395 25546 5.6564 6065.6310
Spain 0.5433 2.1593 2.1309 22445 0.5475 3273.5390
Israel 0.7989 3.5000 1.9656 22003 . .
Greece 0.2754 2.2421 2.1162 18834 0.8266 3082.1880
Portugal 0.4377 1.7066 2.0345 18398 0.3275 2745.0350
Slovenia 0.6581 3.3278 1.5314 18018 . .
Czech Republic 0.5474 3.0845 1.8317 16556 2.6415 2444.1780
Hungary 0.4942 2.2740 1.0678 14159 0.6698 .
These summary statistics do not use design and population size weights.
Max
pro-immig dummy equals one if the individual would like many or some immigrants (of the same race and ethnic group as
the majority), zero otherwise (that is, if the individual would like a few immigrants or none). real income is household's total
net income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of household members. education (highest level
attained) goes from 0 to 6 (not completed primary education; primary or first stage of basic; lower secondary or second
stage of basic; upper secondary; post secondary, non-tertiary; first stage of tertiary; second stage of tertiary). per capita gdp
in 2002 (PPP, constant 2000 international $) is from the World Bank.
The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant
populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of
individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the number of individuals with lower secondary education. The
RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 2002-2003 (OECD 2005). benefits is per capita social expenditure
in 1998 (at constant 1995 prices and PPP-adjusted).
Table 8 (cont.).  Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country (ESS) and of country-
level variables
Summary statistics in this table are based on the same observations as in regression (3), Table 8. These summary statistics do 
not use design and population size weights.
Table 8. Summary statistics of individual-level variables (ESS data set)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min
R
Probit with country dummy variables 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable
year of birth 0.0049 0.0084 0.0045 0.0053 0.0063
0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0010**
male 0.0536 0.0734 0.0512 0.0454 0.0431
0.0296+ 0.0286* 0.0376 0.0437 0.0354
real income 1.3658 1.0075 0.0229
0.6598* 0.4151* 0.0132+
real income*gdp -0.1284 -0.0969
0.0647* 0.0407*
real income*relative skill ratio -0.0026
0.0087
education (highest level attained) -1.3381 -1.4043 0.1047 -2.7551
0.9378 0.8275+ 0.0453* 1.1820*
education*gdp 0.1489 0.1562
0.0921 0.0813+
education*relative skill ratio 0.0638 2.613
0.0299* 1.2033*
education*benefits 0.3423
0.1404*
education*relative skill ratio*benefits -0.3023
0.1407*
Observations 37879 30546 30405 26830 31553
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08
per capita gdp in 2002 (PPP, constant 2000 international $) is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Pro Immig Dummy-ESS
Table 9. Welfare-state and labor-market determinants (ESS data set)
real income is household income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of household members. The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the
relative skill composition. The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both
natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the
number of individuals with lower secondary education. The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 2002-2003 (OECD 2005). benefits is per capita
social expenditure in 1998 (at constant 1995 prices and PPP-adjusted).
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the
constant is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. As recommended in the ESS website, our estimation uses
both design and population size weights. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects.
Figure 1: The country-specific impact of education and income on immigration attitudes (ISSP)
This figure is based on the MEs in Table 5. The slope of the line is 9.41e-07, significant at the 1% level (robust standard
errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the squared standard error of the marginal
effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change and the level of significance is still 1%.
This figure is based on the MEs in Table 5. The slope of the line is -2.38e-06, significant at the 1% level (robust standard
errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the squared standard error of the marginal
effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change and the level of significance is still 1%.
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Figure 2: The country-specific impact of education and income on immigration attitudes (ISSP)
This figure is based on the MEs in Table 7. The slope of the line is 0.0014, significant at the 16% level (robust standard
errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the squared standard error of the marginal
effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change although the significance level decreases.
This figure is based on the MEs in Table 7. The slope of the line is -0.0053, significant at the 2% level (robust standard
errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the squared standard error of the marginal
effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change and the level of significance is 14%.
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